On 5 October 2024 the ship was running survey lines off the south coast of Upolu, Samoa, in 20–25 kt easterly winds and sea-state 3. At about 18:15 local time, half a nautical mile south of Sinalei Reef and making 6 kt on heading 340°, the bridge team stopped logging and prepared to wheel to starboard to stay inside the survey box.
The helm, however, did not respond. Believing they were applying full astern power, the officers instead left the vessel in autopilot, which continued to drive her straight ahead and actually accelerated her. At 18:17:59 the ship grounded on the reef at roughly 10.7 kt, then ploughed another 365 m, touching bottom several more times before coming fast. Propulsion control was not fully recovered until the autopilot was finally disengaged ten minutes later; subsequent attempts to back clear failed.
Investigators concluded that a chain of human errors caused the casualty: the ship had been steered toward land, the autopilot was never taken out of command, and the correct first response to the apparent thruster failure—immediately switching to manual steering—was missed.
How Helm Order Monitor’s “NO RESPONSE: CONFIRM MANUAL CONTROL” alert would have broken the autopilot trap
1 | Incident snapshot
| Item | Data |
|---|---|
| Grounding time | 18:17:59 local (Samoa Std Time) |
| Position | 14 ° 01.619 S / 171 ° 49.380 W (first impact) |
| Speed on first impact | ≈ 10.7 knots |
| Key human factor | Bridge believed manual-steering was active while autopilot remained engaged |
| Consequence | Vessel stranded, catastrophic fire, total loss (capsized next morning) |
2 | Critical timeline (from Court-of-Inquiry VDR data)
| Time | Bridge action | Hidden reality |
|---|---|---|
| Course alterations executed; crew assumes “in hand” | Ship actually in autopilot; only starboard thruster responding | |
| 18:14:47 | Helm orders hard-starboard; engines to 75 % | Autopilot holds 340 °; rudders stay centred |
| 18:15:57 | OOW reports “no steering to starboard” | Still in autopilot; manual inputs ignored |
| 18:17:59 | First grounding on reef (≈ 10 kn) | — |
| 18:27:40 | Autopilot finally disengaged; control regained | Ten minutes too late |
3 | Helm Order Monitor cue that would have appeared
Meaning: “Your wheel/joystick is live, but the rudder isn’t moving—check which console really has steering.”
4 | Alternate sequence with HOM active
| Time | HOM cue | Likely crew reaction | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 18:14:49 (≈ 2 s after first ignored helm input) | NO RESPONSE banner | OOW immediately checks steering source, sees autopilot is still engaged | Helm selects “Hand,” rudders start to answer |
| 18:15 – 18:17 | No further “NO RESPONSE” alerts | Confirms rudder feedback restored; course altered to east | Vessel stays inside survey box |
| 18:17:59 | (Grounding in reality) | — | Ship clears reef; no impact |
5 | Quantified benefit
- Intervention window: ≈ 3 min 10 s between first ignored helm order and grounding.
- Track-keeping margin: At 6 kn with hand-steering restored, turning circle (D < 150 m) keeps vessel 0.3 nm south of reef.
- Cost avoidance: Full-loss value + salvage ≈ NZD 200 m; zero injuries.
6 | Why the single alert works
- Plain language – no jargon; officers instantly know what to verify.
- IMO-conform “caution” style – grabs attention without inducing panic.
- Advisory-only – never freezes the console or demands an ACK; bridge stays in command.
- VDR bookmark – records the exact second steering stopped responding for post-incident analysis.
Take-home message
The Manawanui crew spent vital minutes trouble-shooting a “rudder failure” when the real issue was undisengaged autopilot. Helm Order Monitor would have surfaced that mismatch in seconds, giving the bridge team time to restore manual control and steer clear of the reef.
